

## Message Text

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITSALS PRIORITY 5438

USNMR SHAPE PRIORIY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USLOSACLANT PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4530

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO, CSCE, PARM, PFOR

SUBJECT: CSCE/CBMS: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

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SUMMARY: ON AUGUST 26, POLADS HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF BOTH NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVER CBMS, AND AGREED TO RECOMMEND A NUMBER OF PROCEDURES INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING:

(A) CONCERNING ALL CMBS MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS BETWEEN NATO ALLIES, ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS AT NATO WILL SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT FOR FORMAL CSCE NOTIFICATION, BUT FOR THE RECORD ALLIES WILL ASLO EXCHANGE "A PIECE OF PAPER" AT NATO HEADQUARTERS.

(B) CONCERNING VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANEUVERS, ALLIES PARTICIPATING WILL CONSULT CASE-BY-CASE ON ADVISABILITY OF CONFIDENTIAL

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VOLUNATRY NOTIFICATION, AND ON WHETHER CIRCUMSTANCES CALL FOR VOLUNTARY PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS.

(C) IN VOLUNTARY PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALLEER

MANEUVERS, ALLIES AGREE TO MENTION ONLY NUMBER OF "TROOPS" (AS USED IN THE CSCE TEXT); AND NOT TO INCLUDE MENTION OF OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING SUCH AS CREWS OF SEPARATE NAVAL AND AIR UNITS.

(D) CONCERNING OBSERVER CBM:

(1) OBSERVERS NORMALLY WOULD ONLY BE INVITED TO NOTIFIED MANEUVERS.

(2) PARTICIPATING ALLIES SHOULD DECIDE CASE-BY-CASE WHETHER TO INVITE OBSERVERS, AND IF SO, TO WHICH PARTS OF THE MANEUVERS THEY SHOULD BE INVITED.

(3) HOST NATION(S) SHOULD USUALLY ISSUE THE INVITATIONS, BUT ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS OTHER PARTICIPANTS MAY ALSO WISH TO EXTEND JOINT OR SEPARATE INVITATIONS.

END SUMMARY.

1. PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFICATIONS- AUGUST 26 PLLADS DISCUSSION OF CBMS BEGAN WITH EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON EXPERIENCES WITH THE NOTIFICATIONS OF GROSSEE ROCHADE AND DEEP EXPRESS. POLADS' CHAIRMAN (KILLHAM) RECALLED WHERE AND HOW NOTIFICATIONS WERE ACTUALLY GIVEN BY THE FRG, US, CANADA AND FRANCE ON GROSSEE ROCHADE AND BY TURKEY AND UK ON DEEP EXPRESS. FRG REP (CITRON) SAID RESULTS WERE PRELIMINARY BUT FRG NOTIFICATIONS WERE GENERALLY RECEIVED BY ADDRESSEES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS. HE SAID THE SWISS INQUIRED OF THE FRG DIPLOMAT DELIVERING THE NOTE VERBALE WHETHER OBSERVERS WOULD ALSO BE INVITED TO GROSSEE ROCHADE. CANADIAN REP (ROY) AND US REP (LEDOGAR) INDICATED THEY TOO HAD SEEN ONLY SCATTERED REPORTS AS TO HOW THE ACTUAL NOTIFICATIONS WENT. COMMITTEE AGREED IT WAS TOO EARLY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ON THE BASIS OF THESE FIRST EXPERIENCES.

2. THERE WAS GENERAL SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF STANDARDIZATION  
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OF PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFICATIONS, HOWEVER THERE WERE DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO WHETHER NON-NATO CSCE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PREFERABLY BE NOTIFIED AT THEIR OWN CAPITALS. FRG REP CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT ALLIES' FIRST SEVERAL NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE MADE IN RECIPIENTS' CAPITALS, ESPECIALLY, HE SAID, AS THIS EXCUSE FOR ADDITIONAL CONTACT WITH HOST GOVERNMENT IS ALWAYS WELCOMED BY ALLIED EMBASSIES IN EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS. TURKISH REP ARGUED AGAINST SEEKING ALLIED STANDARDIZATION AS QUESTION WAS DIFFERENT FOR COUNTRY LIKE THE UNITED STATES WITH SO MANY DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS, AND COUNTRY LIKE TURKEY WHICH HAS RESIDENT REPRESENTATION IN RELATIVELY FEW CSCE CAPITALS.

3. COMMITTEE EXCHANGED VIEWS ON GIVING NOTIFICATION TO NATO ALLIES, NOTING VARIETY OF PROCEDURES FOLLOWED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TWO EXERCISES. SEVERAL REPS INSISTED STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF CSCE FINAL DOCUMENT REQUIRED THAT WRITTEN CSCE NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN ALSO TO NATO ALLIES. US AND OTHERS ARGUED THAT PRIOR NATO CONSULTATIONS WERE FAR MORE SIGNIFICANT EVENT THAN DIPLOMATIC NOTIFICATIONS AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SATISFYING NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. BROAD CONSENSUS FAVORED NATO HEADQUARTERS RATHER THAN NATO CAPITALS AS MORE APPROPRIATE LOCUS FOR INTER-ALLIED NOTIFICATIONS. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FELT IT PARTICULARLY AWKWARD IN THE CASE OF GROSSEE ROCHADE TO BE GIVING ANY SORT OF FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE FRG, WHICH IS OF COURSE THE HOST COUNTRY FOR THE EXERCISE. US REP SUGGESTED ALLIES MIGHT AGREE THAT AMONG THEMSELVES FORMAL CSCE REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE SATISFIED BY THE PROCESS OF PRIOR CONSULTATIONS, HOWEVER, FOR THE RECORD, SOME "PIECE OF PAPER" WOULD ALSO BE EXCHANGED IN NATO HEADQUARTERS. THE WRITTEN IN-HOUSE MESSAGE COULD TAKE THE FORM OF EITHER A DIPLOMATIC NOTE OR AN INFORMAL LETTER SIMPLY FORWARDING THE TEXT OF THE ACTUAL NOTIFICATION USED IN NON-ALLIED CSCE CAPITALS. HE PERSONALLY FAVORED THE LATTER CHOICE. COMMITTEE AGREED TO ADOPT THIS "COMPROMISE".

4. VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER MANEUVERS--TURKISH REP SAID ON BASIS OF "DEEP EXPRESS" EXPERIENCE, ANKARA THOUGHT QUESTION OF WHETHER TO VOLUNTEER NOTIFICATION OF BELOW 25,000 TROOP LEVEL MANEUVERS SHOULD BE SUBJECT FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN EACH MANEUVER. CONFIDENTIAL

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TURKISH REP OPPOSED ARBITRARY TROOP LEVEL SUB-CEILINGS ABOVE WHICH VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE OR PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS WOULD BE ADVISABLE, AND HE THOUGHT WHOLE QUESTION OF VOLUNTARY PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD ALSO BE DECIDED AMONG THE CONCERNED ALLIES ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ANKARA HAD FELT THE REASONS WHY THE UK WISHED TO MAKE PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS OF DEEP EXPRESS AND WHY NETHERLANDS DID NOT WERE EQUALLY VALID, AND THEREFORE TURKEY OPPOSED ATTEMPTS TO AGREE ON COMMON GUIDELINES OR ATTITUDES. AS AN EXAMPLE, TURKISH REP HYPOTHESIZED THAT NUMBER OF "TROOPS", AS THIS TERM IS USED IN CSCE CONTEXT, SHOULD NOT BE THE CRITERION BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE CASES WHERE (A) ONE PARTICIPANT MIGHT HAVE RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF "TROOPS" INVOLVED IN A MANEUVER, BUT SUBSTANTIAL NAVAL AND AIR COMPONENTS, AND THAT ALLY MIGHT THEREFORE WISH TO VOLUNTEER NOTIFICATION; AND (B) ANOTHER ALLY MIGHT HAVE A LARGER NUMBER OF "TROOPS" BUT ITS OVERALL TOTAL PARTICIPATION MIGHT BE LESS SUBSTANTIAL. UK, FRG, FRENCH, US, NORWEGIAN, GREEK, CANADIAN AND DANISH REPS ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH THESE TURKISH VIEWS. BELGIAN REP SAID BRUSSELS WOULD HOPE THAT ALLIES PARTICIPATING IN A PARTICULAR SMALLER MULTI-NATIONAL MANEUVER MIGHT AGREE TO FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE WITH REGARD TO PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS.

ITALIAN REP SUPPORTED THE BELGIAN VIEW.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4530

5. CONTENT OF PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS -- US REP, DRAWING ON PARA 3, REF C AND REPEATING SAME POINTS MADE IN PARA 4, REF B, ARGUED THAT IN VOLUNTARY PARALLEL NOTIFICATIONS OF SMALLER MANEUVERS, ALLIES SHOULD MENTION ONLY THE NUMBER OF THEIR OWN "TROOPS" PARTICIPATING -- AS "TROOPS" AS USED IN CSCE TEXT AND DEFINED IN THE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS ALLIED CSCE DELEGATIONS EXCHANGED TO RECORD THE INTERPRETATION OF VARIOUS CSCE PASSAGES -- RATHER THAN MENTIONING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING. COMMITTEE UNANIMOUSLY AGREED.

6. COMMITTEE ALSO AGREED THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT HAVE SEPARATE STANDARDS FOR THE NUMBER OF DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE IN THE CASE OF "REQUIRED" VS "VOLUNTARY" NOTIFICATION OR "PRINCIPAL" VS "PARALLEL" NOTIFICATIONS; BUT RATHER, FOR SIMPLICITY THE GOAL SHOULD BE 21 DAYS OR MORE NOTIFICATION IN ALL INSTANCES.

7. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVER CBM'S -- US REP MADE POINTS IN PARA 2, REF A AND COMMITTEE GENERALLY  
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AGREED THAT OBSERVERS NORMALLY WOULD ONLY BE INVITED TO NOTIFIED MANEUVERS. NO OBJECTIONS WERE RAISED TO THE US

CONCEPT OF TWO-STEP INVITATIONS AND MAJORITY OF POLADS INCLUDING THE UK AND CANADIAN REPS THOUGHT REFORGER 75 PROVIDED BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLIES TO MAKE THEIR FIRST OBSERVER INVITATIONS. FRENCH REP SAID HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS AND INQUIRED IF ANYONE KNEW HOW MANY FRENCH TROOPS WERE PARTICIPATING. COMMITTEE GENERALLY LACKED SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON REFORGER 75. US REP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT REFORGER WOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 1 OCTOBER AND 25 NOVEMBER, THAT IN ADDITION TO THE US, CANADIAN, FRG, BRITISH AND FRENCH MILITARY FORCES WOULD PARTICIPATE, THAT BOTH FRG AND LUXEMBOURG TERRITORY WOULD BE INVOLVED, AND THAT THE FRENCH CONTRIBUTION WAS SCHEDULED TO BE ONE REGIMENT OF DRAGOONS. ALLIES AGREED COORDINATION SHOULD BEGIN PROMPTLY ON THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS AND THAT THIS WOULD MEAN AGREEMENT AMONG PARTICIPANTS ON INVITATION OF OBSERVERS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE EXPEDITED.

8. UK REP RAISED PROBLEM OF "AUTUMN SALES" WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD WAS PART OF "REFORGER" AND HE REPEATED THAT, AS THIS WILL BE THE FIRST TIME THE BRITISH ARMY WILL BE TESTING NEW PROCEDURES, THE UK WOULD WANT NO OBSERVERS AT AUTUMN SALES. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT AUTUMN SALES WAS A COMMAND POST AND NOT A FIELD EXERCISE AND THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH PARTS OF LARGE EXERCISES AND WHICH DATES IN EXTENDED EXERCISES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR NEUTRAL AND EASTERN OBSERVERS TO ATTEND. COMMITTEE AGREED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 2 ON NOTIFICATION OF AN INVITATION TO OBSERVERS FOR REFORGER 75.

9. FOLLOWING THE MEETING, LUXEMBOURG REP (HOSTERT) TOLD US REP HE WAS UNAWARE HIS COUNTRY WAS INVOLVED IN REFORGER AND SAID HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY. HE ASKED IF THE US THOUGHT LUXEMBOURG SHOULD BE AMONG THOSE NOTIFYING. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT THE CSCE TEXT WAS AMBIGUOUS ON WHETHER COUNTRY WITH TERRITORY BUT NO TROOPS INVOLVED IN A MANEUVER SHOULD NOTIFY. GOOD CASE COULD BE MADE EITHER WAY, BUT OTHER CONSIDERATIONS BEING EQUAL, THE US WOULD PROBABLY FAVOUR LUXEMBOURG JOINING OTHERS IN GIVING THE REQUIRED NOTIFICATION.

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10. PRIOR TO POLADS MEETING, FRG REP TOLD US HE HAD BEEN FURNISHED BY BONN WITH A LIST OF MORE THAN 40 DETAILED OPTIONS WHICH ALLIES MIGHT USE IN DISCUSSING OBSERVER CBM (OF THE SORT: "INVITE ALL 35 CSCE PARTICIPANTS?; INVITE 20?; INVITE NEIGHBORING STATES?: A CROSS-SECTION OF PARTICIPANTS?; THREE WARSAW PACT AND THREE NEUTRAL? ETC?"). HE SAID HE FEARED THAT IF HE TABLED THESE OPTIONS, ALLIES WOULD COME TO THE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH ALL SORTS OF DIVERSE INSTRUCTIONS, AND POLADS CBM'S COORDINATION WOULD AGAIN BOG DOWN IN A THEORETICAL RATHER THAN PRAGMATIC APPROACH OF DEALING WITH MANEUVERS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AND BUILDING UP EXPERIENCE

IN CBM IMPLEMENTATION. HE HAD URGENTLY REQUESTED THAT BONN RELIEVE HIM OF THE INSTRUCTION TO TABLE THESE OPTIONS, AND HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO USE HIS JUDGEMENT. US REP SAID FRG REP HAD DONE THE RIGHT THING IN NOT VETTING THE OPTIONS. FRG REP LATER TOLD US HE THOUGHT GOOD PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE COMMITTEE ON MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF CBM'S IMPLEMENTATION BUT THERE WAS NEED TO MOVE PROMPTLY IN BONN ON BILATERAL US-FRG CONVERSATIONS ABOUT OBSERVERS FOR REFORGER. US RP SAID WE TOO PREFERRED TO SEE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS MOVE AHEAD IN BONN, AND WE HOPED SOME DECISIONS COULD BE REACHED FOR USE IN CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES, AND IN TIME FOR SEPTEMBER 2 POLADS. WE NEED DECISIONS BOTH AS TO WHICH COUNTRIES WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN NOTIFICATION OF AND IN THE INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS OF REFORGER.

11. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST -- FOR SEPTEMBER 2 POLADS, WE WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL GENERAL GUIDANCE, HOPEFULLY OF THE SORT IN REF A WHICH WAS MOST USEFUL. AT THE SAME TIME, WE REALIZE THAT FOCUS FOR ACTION IN MOVING TOWARD THE GOAL IF INVITING OBSERVERS TO REFORGER MUST FOR NOW REMAIN IN BONN (BONN 13967 IS ENCOURAGING IN THIS REGARD). ONCE US AND FRG ARE IN ACCORD WE WOULD NOT EXPECT DIFFICULTIES WITH CANADIANS, FRENCH, AND OTHERS. THUS FAR, WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED NO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO US VIEWS ON CBM IMPLEMENTATION, EXCEPT FOR OUR INITIATIVE TO NOTIFY THE OVERALL AUTUMN FORGE SERIES. RATHER, ALLIES SEEM TO BE GRATEFUL FOR US LEADERSHIP AND TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF NATO SETTING HIGH STANDARDS AGAINST WHICH TO HOLD THE WARSAW PACT. WE WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON CBM PRESS POLICY (SEE SEPTTEL), ON WHETHER US SHOULD ENCOURAGE LUXEMBOURG TO GIVE PARALLEL NOTIFICATION OF REFORGER AND ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF OBSERVER

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INVITATIONS FOR EXERCISE REFORGER.  
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